Summaries
Bo Dahlin, 2002: »Science is heavy». Aspects of Pre-Service Science
Teachers’ Conceptions of Science /Den tunga vetenskapen Aspekter av
blivande NA-lärares föreställningar om naturvetenskap/. Pedagogisk
Forskning i Sverige, Vol7, No2, pp81–98. Stockholm. ISSN 1401-6788
In 1887 the second edition of Nietzsche’s Gay Science appeared, extended
with an appendix called »Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei». Nietzsche’s
intention was to make science more poetic, playful and artistic, thereby
giving expression to the undetermined and/or non-determinable ultimate
nature of reality. Nietzsche’s vision of a poetic science remained
neglected for almost a century. However, towards the end of the previous
century, it was resurrected in postmodernist ways of thinking.
Postmodernism spread in academic circles, primarily within the human and
social sciences. In the US it has led to a »Science War» between human and
social sciences on the one side, and natural science on the other (cf. the
Sokal-affair). But these debates have hardly had any serious impact on the
way research in natural science is conducted. Present-day »Big Science» is
a very serious business, being strongly connected with technological and
economical interests and developments.
An important source of inspiration behind Nietzsche’s thinking was J.W.
Goethe. Mostly recognised for his poetry, Goethe was however also a serious
student of natural phenomena. Present-day philosophers have identified
Goethe’s approach to natural studies as hermeneutic-phenomenological in
character. Goethe always stressed the importance of attentive
sense-percep-tual observation of phenomena and of resisting the tendency to
premature abstract theorising. In the realm of optics, he argued intensely
against Newton’s theory of the nature of prismatic colours, and his notion
of light as consisting of seven basic colours.
Goethe's own formulation of a theory of colour is a good candidate for a
gay science in Nietzsche’s sense, being much more poetic than Newton’s. Put
very simply, Goethe differs from Newton in seeing colour as the result of
dynamic interactions between light and darkness. He came to this conclusion
by performing many observational experiments, which included looking
through a prism with one’s naked eye at contrasts between various white and
black figures. However, the frames of this paper do not permit a more
thorough presentation of Goethe’s theory of colour.
The conflict between Newton’s and Goethe’s theories of colour was taken as
a starting point for an empirical study of conceptions of science among
pre-service science teachers. Understanding the nature of science has long
been considered an aspect of science literacy and therefore taken as an
overriding aim of science teaching. The question of the nature of science
has important social and political aspects, which have been particularly
pointed out within feminist theories of science. If a line of thinking and
research is not considered scientific it cannot partake of the economic
resources distributed by State institutions and it looses a lot of its
possible impact on social and cultural development. Science teaching is an
important factor in establishing socially dominant views of what is science
and what is not.
In this study, the conflict between Goethe and Newton was to encourage
student teachers to express basic assumptions and conceptions of the nature
of science. Some of Goethe’s central observational experiments with a prism
were conducted and the difference between Goethe’s and Newton’s theories
was explained to the participating students (altogether 23 individuals).
The students were then divided into smaller groups of 3–6 and asked to
discuss among themselves whether Goethe’s theory could be considered
scientific or not. The group discussions were taped, transcribed and
analysed both in terms of form and of thematic contents. Due to lack of
space, only a part of the thematic contents is presented in this paper.
The participants were generally reluctant to admit that Goethe’s theory of
colour could be regarded as a science. In summary, three main reasons were
expressed against the claim that Goethe’s theory was scientific: it does
not explain phenomena by going »behind» them into invisible entities of a
mathematical nature; it builds upon purely subjective sensory experience;
and it lacks »gravity» or »substance». The three arguments are connected
and can be construed as a complex whole. They build to a large extent on
unreflected views of science as a product, i.e. on conceptions of what
characterises already established scientific theories. In contrast, the
arguments expressed for accepting Goethe’s theory as a science seemed to
be based on views of science as primarily a process of inquiry. The
systematic and open-minded way in which Goethe went about studying colour
phenomena were seen as an important characteristic of scientific research.
The fact that Goethe’s theory was generally considered not to be scientific
did not necessarily entail that Newton’s theory was regarded as truer.
Newton’s theory just happens to be the one used and proclaimed in schools,
as one student expressed it. Nevertheless there was a strong tendency to
belittle or even deny the significance of sense perception in scientific
research, com-pared to the importance of the abstract mathematical models
of conventional science.
Two metaphorical expressions for the nature of science appeared as
particularly useful in catching the predominant views of science among the
participants (the metaphors were actually used by two different students):
science as »heavy» and as »peeled-off». The »heavy» character of science
refers to its mathematical complexity and its complicated laboratory
instruments. Other heavy aspects are the thick textbooks in which science
is often presented and the difficulties in comprehending their contents.
(One could add the vast economic resources that go into financing modern
Big Science, but the students did not mention this.) The »peeled-off»
character of science refers to its impersonal, objectivistic nature.
Science must not contain anything of a personal, let alone emotional
nature. Everything »merely subjective» has to be left outside the
laboratory doors, as it were. The two metaphors of heaviness and
peeled-off-ness can be seen as complementary and belonging together, in
that it is the striving for impersonality and objectivity that leads to the
development of technical instruments of measurement and mathematical
formulations. In contrast to the heavy and peeled-off character of
conventional science, Goethe’s theory appeared as too »light» and
non-substantial to be scientific.
Applying C.S. Peirce’s view of cognitive-semiotic processes to these
notions, it is possible to give a more analytic explanation of what lies
behind the resistance to accepting Goethe’s colour theory as science.
According to Peirce, there is a triadic and dynamic relation between a
sign, its referent and its interpretant. The »interpretant» is the
interpreting element in meaning constitution, but it is not identical with
the conventional notion of a particular individual subject. It can also be
a regular or habitual response of a collective or cultural character. If
»heavy and peeled-off» is the interpretant commonly produced by the signs
»science» and »scientific», it is understandable that Goethe’s colour
theory cannot become a referent to these signs, since it is rather seen as
»light», non-substantial and subjective.
Introducing Goethe’s theory of colour and his general approach to the study
of nature into science teacher education and school science would challenge
the ideology of consensus that characterise much of the science curriculum
today. Science is generally presented as a homogenous, non-contestable body
of knowledge with few, if any, inherent controversies or conflicts. It
would also create a variation in instructional contents on two levels: on
the phenomenal level and on the paradigmatic level. On the phenomenal
level, the possibility to understand colours in two different ways would be
uncovered. On the paradigmatic level, the possibility of other ways of
doing science would appear.
It is commonly known that the character of a thing is more clearly
apprehended if it is contrasted with another (similar) thing. Thus,
understanding Goethe’s way of doing science also deepens the understanding
of the nature of conventional science and contributes to science literacy.
It would also point out the possible significance of sense perception in
science teaching and learning. For Goethe, the human being with
well-cultivated senses was the supreme instrument of research into nature.
If science teachers belittle or even neglect the significance of sense
perception in understanding natural phenomena, it may contribute to
alienating their students both from nature and from science. Science would
continue to be a heavy, non-human affair, in spite of postmodernist clamours.
Bo Dahlin, Department of Education, Karlstad University, SE-651 88 Karlstad, Sweden
pp 154-156
Erik Wallin, 2002: School development: An issue of lifting yourself by the
hair – or what? /Att utveckla skolan: En fråga om att lyfta sig själv i
håret – eller vad?/. Pedagogisk Forskning i Sverige, Vol7, No2, pp99–129.
Stockholm. ISSN 1401-6788
Behind this article are my experiences of helping to establish a new local
school, Håbo School, in a process of change spanning across the total
educational system of the local community. The changes were not initiated
at the school level, but rather at the local community level. The changes
were also radical. They have their roots in political decisions with
pedagogical consequences and in a fundamental respect may be better
conceived of as representing a reform rather than a local innovation or
development. Through the changes initiated the students are organised in
working teams with their own rooms and staff and they have considerable
autonomy.
Håbo School is still developing, but experiences thus far are very
positive. This positive outcome stands in some opposition to the
proposition that no change is possible if not initiated by the school
itself (lately expressed among others by Ingrid Carlgren and Berit
Hörnqvist, 1999). In the present article this proposition is tested against
the experiences from the changes initiated and accomplished at Håbo School.
Swedish research concerning school innovation and development is discussed
initially. Perspectives and theoretical frameworks within this research
have varied, but it is possible to find a common perspective that is almost
of institutional character. The concept institution is important in the
article and this concept is presented and then related to other concepts
like tradition, culture, autonomy and relative autonomy. At Håbo School the
school staff members do not have full autonomy, but they do have a relative
autonomy vis-à-vis curricula and other government directives.
The concept of institution is discussed in relation to different
authorities and examples are given of how Håbo School was anchored in the
local community and among the school staff. Institutional theories are
discussed in relation to the work of Douglass North (1993) and Mary Douglas
(1986). The former points out that institutional norms concerning
predictability and safeness in relations are important within institutions
while the latter, as an anthropologist, takes notice of how categories of
thoughts and shared values are formed in institutions as communities.
Together the two theories suggest something of the difficulty of change
processes when the force for change is exerted from the outside so to
speak. However, communicative theories (Säljö 2000) are also important when
we consider institutions and institutional change. In these theories words
and the conversations that tear away the veil of the self-evident and give
everyday trivialities and routines a reflective meaning are important.
These theories suggest that change brought about by pressure from the
outside is possible, depending on how the change is initiated. Håbo School
is an example.
The cardinal proposition of change expressed in the article is that we
exist in our words and in our memories and that this means that it is
neither probable nor sufficient that ideas about and an initial impetus for
change emanates from within an institution. Institutions cannot, at least
not by their own power, lift themselves by their hair.
Erik Wallin, Department of Education, Uppsala University, PO Box 2109, SE-750 02 Uppsala, Sweden
pp 157-158
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